Cloud security is a system engineering problem. A common approach to address the problem is to adapt existing Trusted Network Connection (TNC) framework in the cloud environment, which can be used to assess and verify end clients' system state. However, TNC cannot be applied to network equipment attached to the cloud computing environment directly. To allow the network devices to access the trusted network devices safely and reliably, we first developed a Trusted Network Equipment Access Authentication Protocol (TNEAAP). We use the BAN logic system to prove that TNEAAP is secure and credible. We then configure the protocol in an attack detection mode to experimentally show that the protocol can withstand attacks in the real network. Experiment results show that all the nine goals that decide the protocol's security have been achieved. model
platform. The authentication protocol achieves these targets: safety, credibility, and low overhead. The security of the protocol is analyzed by a formalization method based on BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic, which can reveals vulnerabilities and redundancy [22] . The protocol processes are formalized with HLPSL (High-Level Protocol Specification Language) [23] . The formalization of the protocol processes is tested by plugging into an attacking model of the safety testing tool to check whether the protocol is secure or not.
In the rest of the paper, section 2 shows the design of the authentication method for the trusted network devices to join in the network. Section 3 formalizes our protocol by BAN logic for safety analysis. Section 4 presents the experiment, which uses the attack model to attack the protocol and to demonstrate that protocol is secure. Section 5 gives the network equipment performance evaluation. We conclude the paper in section 6.
DESIGN OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
As shown in Fig. 1 , the proposed trusted network equipment access authentication protocol (TNEAAP) consists of three major components: requester, boundary network equipment, and network authentication management server.
1) Requester(R): it is a piece of network equipment, in which a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is embedded. The Requester sends the metric information to the authentication management server when it wants to be a member of the network. 2) Boundary network equipment (BNE): it is a strategy execution device that controls the requester to access the network. 3) Network authentication management server (NAMS): it is a decision builder that manages network equipment and an administrator in the trusted network. The proposed authentication process of TNEAAP is divided into the following three steps: (1) Issuing of trusted certification: A requester R registers itself to the trusted certificate server, as shown in Fig.1 , and then R applies for a trusted certificate from the server. R sends hardware information, software information, operating system version, and public key of R to the trusted certificate server. The server verifies information. If it is correct, the server will generate a trusted certificate and issue it to R. (2) Platform authentication: This step performs the equipment platform authentication. R sends the Storage Measurement Log (SML) to the NAMS. NAMS validates whether SML accords with the trusted metric accessing rules. If information is certified by NAMS, the requester will be allowed to join into the network. (3) Administrator authentication: When an administrator logs onto the network device (requester NAMS R), R sends the administrator information to NAMS, which checks whether the administrator is legal or not. In this paper, we do not discuss the trusted certificate server's strategy, and we focus on the security issues of the proposed authentication protocol.
Formalization of TNEAAP
The foregoing platform authentication and administrator authentication steps of TNEAAP are shown in Fig. 2 , which elaborates the authentication process. The steps of the process listed in the figure are explained as follows.
. (1) ii) NAMS sends a random number to R. In the step (i), NAMS has obtained R's ID and NAMS pub , which means that R trusts NAMS. Then NAMS generates a random number nonce NAMS . NAMS sends nonce NAMS and R pub signed by the private key of NAMS (NAMS -1 ) to R, where R pub is the public key of R.
Platform
iii) R sends a platform authentication message to NAMS. R obtains the random number nonce NAMS and R pub , which indicates that NAMS knows the public key of R. The hash digest of boot up processes is stored in PCR (Platform Configuration Register), which cannot be deleted or modified. PCR's value and nonce NAMS are signed by R's private key R -1 , that is, N = (PCR, nonce NAMS )R -1 . R sends N, SML, and plat_ID signed by R -1 to NAMS.
iv) NAMS sends an acknowledgement message to R. NAMS unpacks the received message by R pub and NAMS -1 , obtains the PCR's value. NAMS compares the hash digest of SML with PCR's value. If the result is consistent, SML is not tampered. Then NAMS considers the boot up process is trusted. NAMS sends ACK (Acknowledgement) of platform authentication success to R and allows R to access network. 1 :
(2) Administrator authentication (requires negotiation session key) v) R sends a user authentication request to NAMS. The request includes plat_ID, username (user_ID), and the current session identifier (SID). R sends the request signed by R -1 to NAMS.
vi) NAMS generates and sends a session key random number to R. NAMS determines whether the user is legal and valid through the plat_ID and user_ID. If the information is valid, NAMS generates a session key random number nonce NAMS-SK and encrypts it by R pub . NAMS signs the cryptograph and SID, then sends this signature information to R. SK is decrypted by the session key SK. NAMS can obtains the user name and password, compares the user information with the user registration information in NAMS. If the user is legal, NAMS sends ACK' acknowledgement of administrator authentication success to R and allows the R to access the trusted network with the administrator login. The certification process is completed with the following action:
TNEAAP FORMALIZATION ANALYSIS
According to BAN logic analysis method and the characteristics of TNEAAP, we analyze whether the authentication protocol is secure or not.
Analysis Procedure
The analysis procedure is as follows: 1) According to BAN logic representation, the authentication protocol is formalized;
2) The security goals of the protocol are determined. The assumptions are initialized. The security goals and initial assumptions are described by logical symbols;
3) The proof of security is to show that if the initial assumptions are applied to the messages of the protocol, and all of the security goals can be inferred from the messages; 4) In the reasoning process, the protocol defects and redundancy can be detected.
The authentication protocol is formalized as equation (1) to equation (8) , and the other analysis steps are as follows.
Security Targets
This section discusses the general BAN logic forms of security objectives. The primary goal is
The initialization assumption is the primary goal in BAN. Thus, the security goals can be defined as the following seven goals:
In words, the seven goals are: ① R believes that NAMS believes that R pub is R's public key; ② NAMS believes that R believes that NAMS pub is NAMS's public key; ③ NAMS believes that R believes that PCR is credible; ④ R believes that NAMS believes that ACK is credible; ⑤ R believes that NAMS believes that nonce NAMS-SK (N NAMS-SK ) is credible; ⑥ NAMS believes that R believes that nonce R-SK (N R-SK ) is credible; ⑦ R believes that NAMS believes that ACK' is credible. The fourth goal is to prove that the platform authentication process is trusted. The seventh goal is to prove that the administrator authentication process is trusted. These two goals are the most important ones.
Initialization assumption
According to the characteristics of TNEAAP, this paper makes the following initialization assumptions:
Analysis
Logical Reasoning Process 1: From the equation (2)we can derive:
Then, we draw the conclusion:
Logical Reasoning Process 2: Similarly to reasoning process 1, from the equation (2) we can draw the conclusion.
Logical Reasoning Process 3: From the equation (3), we can obtain
We can then infer:
We can also infer:
We draw the conclusion
Logical Reasoning Process 4: From the equation (4), we can infer:
And draw the conclusion
Logical Reasoning Process 5:
From the equation (6), we can infer:
Logical Reasoning Process 6: Similarly to reasoning 5, we can draw the conclusion from the equation (7):
Logical Reasoning Process 7: From the equation (8), we can infer:
Results
1) Although PCR, SML, platform ID, ACK, and ACK' are not responsible for the authentication procedure directly, they are not redundant information. They are important for the security of the trusted network, and they play determinative roles in TNEAAP. We do not find redundant information in TNEAAP based on aforementioned analysis, thus it is a concise protocol.
2) In this method, seven security targets can be inferred from the messages of R and NAMS. Thus, TNEAAP is secure in BAN logic reasoning.
THE SECURITY TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF TNEAAP
In this section, we use an experiment to further demonstrate the protocol is secure through an attacking detection method. The experiment should find defects of TNEAAP if there exists any. The protocol authentication processes are formalized using HLPSL [24] protocol description language. Then formalization of the protocol process is plugged into an attacking model of a safety testing tool. Finally the tool gives a conclusion whether TNEAAP can prevent the attack generated by the tool.
Security targets
In this section, we choose Dolev-Yao intruder model [25] for testing our protocol. In this model, an intruder controls the whole network and can perform any operations. The intruder can intercept, analyze, and revise all of messages. The intruder can pretend to be any agent and send disguised messages to anyone in the network. The attacker has the following knowledge and abilities: 1) The attacker is familiar with encryption, decryption, hash, and other cryptographic operations.
The attacker has its own public key and private key; 2) The attacker has obtained the subject's identifier and public key;
3) The attacker has the knowledge and ability of cryptanalysis; 4) The attacker can make various attacks, such as knowledge and ability of replay attacks. This is the strongest intruder model. If TNEAAP can meet the security goals under this intruder model, it proves the protocol can prevent all possible attacks from any attacker.
In this experiment, we define 9 security goals: 1) The transportation process of PCR is confidential;
2) The transportation process of SML is confidential;
3) The transportation process of random number nonce NAMS is confidential; 4) The transportation process of session key random number nonce NAMS-SK is confidential; 5) The transportation process of session key random number nonce R-SK is confidential 6) The transportation process of the administrator's password is confidential; 7) The transportation process of the administrator's username is confidential; 8) The platform authentication success ACK is correct; 9) The user authentication success ACK' is correct. According to the above security goals, we use AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [26] network communication protocol security inspection system to test the security of our protocol.
AVISPA
AVISPA is a set of the establishment and analysis tools of security protocols [26] . It is one of the widest used protocols in the cryptography. As shown in Fig.3 , it combines four types of analyses at backends: On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC), CL-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), and Tree-Automata based Protocol Analyzer (TA4SP). The user first inputs the participants' identification of protocol and then selects the running environment, goal, attacker ability variables. Finally, the user specifies the desired security properties in order to find whether there are problems in the protocol under test. The code written in HLPSL language is translated into IF (Intermediate Format) language through HLPSL2IF translation tools. Analysis of terminal AVISPA tool set can directly read IF language. It can analyze whether security goals are successful or not. If the protocol is unsafe, the analysis terminal will give us the attack track events. 
Basic roles
In HLPSL, each participant is defined in a module separately, called basic role, which describes its initial state and its state transitions. We define two basic roles, as shown in Table 1 : a network authentication manager server NAMS (a) and a Requester (r). 
Security goals
For evaluating the security properties of TNEAAP, we first formulize its security goals [27] . The specified equations are used to assess whether the goals are achieved or not.
AVISPA defines different macros for formalizing the security goals. In our experiment, the macros are described as follow:
1. Macro of information secrecy. T is the information produced by agent A. If T is a shared secret and is shared between agent A and a group of agents, B and C, the secrecy of information T is expressed as follows:
Secret (T, t, A, B, C) where, t is the identification of the information T.
2. Macro of strong authentication detection. This property is formalized using two macros as follows:
Request (B, A, 
t, T) Witness (A, B, t, T) where, Request (B, A, t, T) indicates that agent B receives information T (identified by t) from agent A. Witness (A, B, t, T) indicates that agent A receives information T (identified by t) from agent B.
For evaluating the security of TNEAAP, the following security goals are defined: 1. Authentication of ACK and ACK', where their process IDs are r_ack1 and r_ack2, respectively. We model this goal in HLPSL.
Role r (R, NAMS: agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) Played_by R init State:=0 State':=8/\request(Nonce2', a_nonce2, {R, NAMS}) In the model NAMS declares PCR, SML, nonce NAMS , user_ID, user_PWD, nonce R-SK and SK as the secrets, and R declares nonce NAMS-SK as a secret, where a_x stands for x's process id.
Session scenarios
For the validation purpose, we define three different scenarios. First, we implement a single session with all the roles played by legitimate agents (Scenario 1). Then we test the situations in which the intruder would impersonate the network authentication manager server (Scenario 2) or the requester (Scenario 3). Table 2 lists the HLPSL definition of the sessions associated with each of the mentioned scenarios, where kx refers to the public key of x. 
Experiment results
The experiments are conducted based on the aforementioned model specification. For our verification, we have used OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to search for the attacks on the protocol. The test outputs of the experiment results are summarized in Table 3 . The left column lists the output from the OFMC backend and the right column is from the CL-AtSe backend. According to the summary results in Table 3 , TNEAAP is safe in both OFMC and AtSe backends (Summary: SAFE), and no vulnerabilities in the proposed protocol. If some defects are detected, Summary will be UNSAFE. DETAILS section provides the information that an attack is found in the protocol specification. The IF form of the protocol resides in the path given under the PROTOCOL section of the output, with the file name, 130401203137024905.if. The GOAL section of output describes the result of the goal, which is written in the specitication for the verificaiton process. The backend that verifies the protocol specification is OFMC or CL-AtSe, which is given under the BACKEND. The STATISTICS gives us the time required to execute the protocol specification by the tool and the number of the visited nodes or states during the execution.
For comparison, we have used OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to search for the attacks on the CHAP protocol. The test outputs of the experiment results are summarized in Table 4 . The left column lists the output from the OFMC backend and the right column is from the CL-AtSe backend. According to the summary results in Table 4 , CHAP is unsafe in both OFMC and AtSe backends (Summary: UNSAFE), DETAILS section provides the information that a Man-in-the-middle attack is found in the protocol specification.
NETWORK EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Like all security protocols, TNEAAP take extra steps to ensure the security of the network and its devices. This section evaluates the overhead of implementing TNEAAP from network equipment's point of view. We take both storage and computation overheads into consideration.
Storage overhead
In TNEAAP, each requester has to store two keys permanently: the secret key SK and the NAMS's public key NAMS pub .
Additionally, each requester also needs to store two nonce values: nonce NAMS and nonce NAMS-SK . Considering the requesters that attempt to access a given node in a completely random basis at mean rate 1/T, the second step of authentication messages in equation (2) received by NAMS can be modelled as a Poisson processwith mean 1/T. For each authentication message received, NAMS stores a nonce NAMS , until it receives the fourth step of authentication message in equation (4) from NAMS or until a timer set to T Lifetime expires. Suppose that the T Lifetime has an upper bound and is reached whenever a packet is lost, assuming a packet loss probability of the network is P, the average number of nonce NAMS that the requester must store is given by equation (40), where T ACK denotes the average time elapsed between the reception of an equation (2) message and its corresponding equation (4) message. We assume that the storage overhead of nonce NAMS and nonce NAMS-SK is the same. Therefore, the requester storage overhead is
As an example, we set T ACK = 10s, T Lifetime = 2T ACK = 20s, and T=5min. Fig. 4 shows overheads incurred from 5, 10, and 50 requesters, with an increasing packet loss probability. As can be seen in the figure, the average number of nonce NAMS and nonce NAMS-SK that NAMS stores is small. It implies that NAMS does not need to have a large buffer to maintain the nonce values. The overall computational overhead incurred by TNEAAP is a fixed number. The individual overheads are from equation (3) and equation (7) . Table 5 summarizes the individual overheads in NEAAP for each type of requesters. Table 5 Computational overhead of cryptographic operations in equation (3) and equation (7) Type of operation equation (3) 
Comparison with other authentication protocols
Now we compare the capacity and overhead of TNEAAP with that of the other security protocols. The results are summarized in Table 6 . As shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , for 50 requesters, our method does not need to have a large buffer to maintain nonce values, and computational overhead is similar to the other protocols. However, TNEAAP supports more security functions, including both authentication capability and authorization capability, which ensure the credibility of the network system is strong. 6. CONCLUSIONS Current trusted network access authentication research pays major attentions to the terminals, and thus the TNC (Trusted Network Connection) does not have an authentication protocol for network devices accessing. In this paper, we developed the TNEAAP protocol, which is more suitable for network equipment, more secure, and more reliable, due to the development of additional mechanism for the equipment's platform authentication.
In the study of TNEAAP, we theoretically and experimentally verified three issues: (1) TNEAAP does not contain any unnecessary information. We analyzed the redundant information by BAN logical system. The results show that the protocol is a concise protocol. (2) The protocol is security in theory. The BAN logic safety analysis has proved TNEAAP is safe and reliable. (3) The protocol is secure in experiment. We tested the protocol under the strongest attack model in our experiments. The nine goals which decided the protocol's security have been achieved in the attack model.
